A jurisdiction of the Indonesian Constitutional Court concerning constitutional adjudication is only limited to review the constitutionality of national law. There is no mechanism for challenging any decision or action made by public authorities that violate fundamental rights enshrined in the Indonesian Constitution. This article argues that constitutional complaint and constitutional question might be adopted as new jurisdictions of the Indonesian Constitutional Court in order to strengthen the protection of fundamental rights of its citizen. It also identifies main problems that will be faced by the Constitutional Court in exercising constitutional complaint and constitutional question. For instance, the Court will be burdened with too many cases as experienced by other countries. A clear mechanism for filtering applications lodged to the Constitutional Court and the time limit for deciding cases are important elements that have to be regulated to overcome the problems. In addition, the institutional structure of the Constitutional Court has to be improved, particularly to support its decisionmaking process.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the main agendas from constitutional reform in Indonesia that occurred from 1999 to 2002 is to strengthen the protection and promotion of human rights. The result of constitutional amendments has incorporated a specific chapter concerning constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights and freedoms which were adopted from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and various international covenants. An effort to enforce those human rights is carried out by establishing several state institutions, particularly the Constitutional Court as a separate and independent court from the Supreme Court.
The Indonesian Constitutional Court is granted several constitutional powers, namely: (1) to review constitutionality of law; (2) to decide disputes concerning the authorities of state institutions whose powers are derived from the Constitution; (3) to decide matters concerning dissolution of political parties; (4) to decide disputes over the result of general elections; (5) to decide legal matters concerning impeachment process of the President and/or the Vice President. At the time of writing, the Constitutional Court has decided 3,519 cases with detailed statistics as follows. There is no direct mechanism available to the Court when citizens feel their fundamental rights have been violated by decisions, policies or actions made by public authorities or state institutions. In addition, the Indonesian constitutional adjudication system does not provide a mechanism for ordinary judges to ask the Constitutional Court concerning the constitutionality of laws or regulations being used as the basis for examining their cases.
Based on a comparative study of constitutional courts from different countries, constitutional question are and how the mechanisms could be adopted into the constitutional adjudication system in Indonesia. It will also highlight several aspects that should be considered seriously if these mechanisms are to be adopted by the Indonesian Constitutional Court.
II. DISCUSSION A. Constitutional Complaint
Constitutional complaint provides one of the major powers of constitutional courts to protect the fundamental rights of citizens. It is defined as a complaint to a constitutional court, lodged by individuals who feel their fundamental or constitutional rights are being violated by public authorities. 1 In some circumstances, municipalities or associations of municipalities, on the basis of their right to self-government, may also lodge a constitutional complaint. 2 Dannemann suggests that constitutional complaint has several characteristics determined by four factors: (1) availability of legal remedies against violations of constitutional rights; (2) existence of a separate process that only examines constitutional issues of an act, not other legal issues; (3) it can be submitted by individuals who are directly affected by that act; and (4) the court that decides a constitutional complaint has a power to restore the rights of victims.
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The constitutional complaint can only be accepted by a constitutional court if all available legal remedies have been carried out or exhausted through the judicial process. In addition, all possibilities to correct or prevent violations of the Constitution must be used. This requirement is also identified as subsidiarity of the constitutional complaint. 4 In some countries, the constitutional complaint can be directed towards an act of public authority, the constitutionality of laws or court decisions. 5 The constitutional court only examines the conformity of an act against the Constitution, while the assessment of legal issues and other facts remain the authority of ordinary courts. As long as no violation of fundamental rights or constitutional rights occurs, the constitutional court is bound by decisions of ordinary courts.
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A study conducted by the Venice Commission in 2010 concerning the efficiency of individual complaint procedures in over fifty countries concluded that there are two types of individual access, namely: (1) a normative constitutional complaint that allows the individual to file a complaint on the violation of fundamental rights based on the unconstitutionality of a law; and (2) a full constitutional complaint that allows the individual to file a complaint on the violation of fundamental rights not only based on the unconstitutionality of law, but also an unconstitutional decision made by other ordinary courts and the Supreme Court. Third, the MPR considered that introducing a constitutional complaint mechanism, with aims to challenge actions and decisions of the government, would reduce the authority of state officials and public authorities to act and make decisions, or create policies. Fourth, the MPR also believed the Court would be burdened with too many cases if it held authority to examine constitutional complaint cases, as compared to other countries with a similar mechanism.
Fifth, the MPR concerned that giving a constitutional complaint power to the Constitutional Court will lead a potential conflict of jurisdiction with other courts, particularly the Supreme Court. Now, more than twelve years after the establishment of the Constitutional Court, I am of the opinion that the MPR's reasons in rejecting constitutional complaint are no longer relevant. A constitutional complaint mechanism might be adopted in the constitutional adjudication system in Indonesia that upholds strong principles of constitutionalism and places the Constitution as the supreme law of the land. 26 In realising such principles, Indonesia has committed to implementing a system of constitutional government. One of the major elements derived from a constitutional government system is protection of fundamental rights of citizens, as explicitly contained in Chapter XA of the constitutional bill of rights in the Indonesian Constitution. 27 However, the inclusion of fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution is certainly not enough. It needs a reliable mechanism to protect, adhere to and enforce those rights. institutions, the absence of a constitutional mechanism that can protect the constitutional right of Indonesian citizens is tantamount to negating an essential element in implementing the system of constitutional government. Therefore, adopting a constitutional complaint mechanism is imperative to strengthen the implementation of the constitutional government system, particularly in providing full protection of citizen's constitutional rights.
The need for establishing a constitutional complaint mechanism in Indonesia can also be seen in many cases lodged with the Constitutional Court that have similar characteristics to constitutional complaint cases. 28 The Court Registration Division, without any trial, rejected most of those cases because the applications were assessed to be beyond the Constitutional Court's jurisdiction. 29 However, there were also several cases examined by the constitutional justices through court hearings, even though these cases, in substance, were constitutional complaint cases. This practice frequently occurs when petitioners modify a constitutional complaint application so that it becomes a case of constitutional review or dispute between state institutions. These cases can be categorised as 'pseudoconstitutional complaint' . As a result, many legal arguments constructed by the applicants use concrete cases, whereas the doctrine held by the Constitutional Court in reviewing the constitutionality of laws is abstract. Thus, the Constitutional Court would have the power to hear and examine constitutional complaint cases, although it would lack legitimacy. In addition, the Court would be sharply criticised for practicing excessive judicial activism.
Furthermore, if the constitutional complaint is to be adopted into the system of fundamental rights protection in Indonesia, the improvement of Second, the Constitutional Court should be given an authority of the dismissal process conducted by a panel of justices, not by registrars or administrative officers, to sort out whether a case can be examined further in court hearings or should be dismissed directly. This filtering mechanism is needed to ensure the Constitutional Court handles caseloads properly.
Third, the Constitutional Court should make clear boundaries regarding constitutional complaint cases that can be examined. Some of the main limitations are: (1) the applicant must be an individual who directly suffered from the loss of their constitutional rights; (2) the application can only be submitted after it has exhausted all available legal remedies; (3) there must be a time limit for applying a constitutional complaint case after a court judgment, actions or decisions made by public authorities or state institutions which violate the constitutional rights of the applicant.
In the context of Indonesia, which has a vast territory lacking adequate access to transportation, information and communication, the time limit for applying a constitutional complaint case should be regulated for at least three months starting from the exhaustion of legal remedies. The comparison concerning the time limit for constitutional complaint submission in various countries can be seen in the following figure. 
B. Constitutional Question
In addition to constitutional complaint, another jurisdiction that might be adopted by the Indonesian Constitutional Court is the constitutional question.
It is a mechanism that allows ordinary judges to review the constitutionality of laws or regulations being used to decide cases in ordinary courts. If judges are unsure or doubtful about the constitutionality of laws or regulations being used for examining their cases, they may delay the examination and question the Constitutional Court. In this matter, the Constitutional Court will only decide the constitutionality of the law or regulation in question. The ordinary judges will then determine the case based on the Constitutional Court's decision. 41 While this mechanism has not been recognised in the Indonesian constitutional annulled the articles as they proved to be contrary to the Constitution.
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Although the Court annulled it, the ordinary court still sentenced him to three months in prison and probation for six months. 44 The legal reason given by the ordinary court was that the action committed by Sudjana occurred before the Constitutional Court declared its decision. According to the judges who decided the case, the effect of Constitutional Court's decision was not retroactive and only applied prospectively. In addition, the Supreme Court strengthened the lower court's decision. 45 Based on this case, the decision of the ordinary court or the Supreme Court would be different if the ordinary court held authority, or at least had an initiative, to apply a constitutional question to the Constitutional Court. Thus, the constitutional rights of citizens would be protected.
The constitutional question mechanism offers several advantages for the constitutional adjudication system in Indonesia. First, the constitutional question can strengthen the protection, respect and fulfilment of constitutional rights of citizens. Thus, if there are citizens who lack awareness or the ability to defend their constitutional rights, they will still receive the minimum protection of constitutional rights without having to actively apply for a constitutional review case to the Constitutional Court.
Nonetheless, the submission of the constitutional question to the Constitutional Court remains highly dependent on the initiative and willingness of ordinary judges. Second, ordinary judges will no longer be forced to use the applicable laws or regulations in examining a case if they doubt that it has potential conflict with the Constitution. Third, the presence of the constitutional question will help to achieve a common understanding among ordinary judges of the importance in upholding the principles of the constitutionality of laws and regulations. If the mechanism of the constitutional question is adopted in Indonesia, the ordinary judges could be more critical of the constitutionality of laws and regulations. Third, another option is to follow the mechanism adopted in the French mechanism that can be used by ordinary judges. In addition, the procedures and requirements will be similar to the process of constitutional review of laws, except the Court creates new court regulation concerning special procedures and requirements for a constitutional question.
The four options explained above offer alternatives for adopting the constitutional question into the constitutional adjudication system in Indonesia.
However, there is also a serious challenge that has to be overcome before the constitutional question can be adopted. The length of time in deciding a constitutional question case by the Constitutional Court should be an important concern. In some countries that have implemented this mechanism, the length of time in deciding a constitutional question case has become an obstacle for the ordinary courts in making their final decision. citizens. Thus, some developments related to its jurisdiction should be improved.
The constitutional complaint and the constitutional complaint mechanism need to be adapted to the Indonesian Constitutional Court.
The most ideal way to add these jurisdictions to the Constitutional Court is by amending the Constitution. Thus, when the Constitutional Court exercises the jurisdictions there will be a strong basis and constitutional legitimacy. The main problems that will be faced when the Constitutional Court adopts these new jurisdictions are the number of cases that will increase sharply and the time limit for decising cases. Therefore, a filtering mechanism of constitutional complaint cases needs to be established. In addition, the institutional structure, human resources and decision-making process have to be strengthened. Otherwise, the Court will be overwhelmed in receiving cases concerning constitutional complaint and constitutional question.
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